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A PERSPECTIVE ON HUMAN DIGNITY, THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT, AND THE RIGHT  
OF PUBLICITY 
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall* 
Abstract: The right of publicity is a legal theory that enables individuals 
to protect themselves from unauthorized, commercial appropriations of 
their personas. Allowing the unauthorized use of an individual’s persona 
potentially poses the maximum harm when the persona is being appro-
priated in an objectionable context or for an objectionable purpose. In 
these instances, neither an award of injunctive relief nor monetary dam-
ages will erase the damage to the persona. These are situations involving 
dignity, as opposed to economic, harms. Much ink has been spilled over 
the intersection between the right of publicity and the First Amendment 
generally. To date, however, neither courts nor commentators have fo-
cused specifically on how the existence of dignity harms should impact 
the analysis in these cases. This Article attempts to open a dialogue on 
this point. 
Introduction 
 The right of publicity is a legal theory that enables individuals to 
protect themselves from unauthorized, commercial appropriations of 
their personas. Although the right of privacy and the right of publicity 
are similar in that both doctrines are aimed at controlling the extent to 
which one party can use the details of the life of another, they nonethe-
less have come to represent distinct legal theories. Publicity actions 
typically are regarded as the means to achieve compensation for the 
loss of financial gain due to a defendant’s unauthorized appropriation. 
In contrast, the right of privacy continues to be regarded as the predi-
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cate for actions based on hurt feelings.1 This distinction is the result of 
fact patterns in seminal cases as well as the legal system’s failure to em-
brace a cohesive legal doctrine that affords individuals the ability to re-
dress unauthorized appropriations of their identities involving both 
economic and reputational damage. 
 Allowing the unauthorized use of an individual’s persona poten-
tially threatens maximum harm when the persona is being appropri-
ated in an objectionable context or for an objectionable purpose. In 
these instances, neither an award of injunctive relief nor monetary 
damages will erase the harm to human dignity already inflicted by the 
user’s unauthorized appropriation. No judicially mandated relief can 
eliminate the effects of this objectionable use of the persona. Such 
situations involve dignity, as opposed to economic, harms. 
 The reality is that many actions based on the unauthorized use of 
personas involve both dignity and economic harms. For example, in 
the 1992 case, Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., singer Tom Waits sued Frito-Lay 
and its advertising agency for using a sound-alike who imitated Waits’ 
distinctive voice in a commercial for Doritos.2 Waits has a firm policy 
against doing commercials because he believes that commercials un-
dermine the artistic integrity of musicians.3 The U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the propriety of a hefty damage award 
and specifically noted that a violation of a plaintiff’s right of publicity 
can induce humiliation and embarrassment.4 Similarly, in the 1990 case 
Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., decided by the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York, the plaintiff singing 
group, the “Fat Boys,” prevailed against the defendant’s motion to dis-
miss with respect to various claims, including violations of the right of 
publicity based on the defendant’s use of a look-alike group in a com-
mercial for beer after the plaintiffs had declined to appear in the 
commercial.5 The singing group fostered a wholesome image, encour-
                                                                                                                      
1 See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 46 cmt. b (1995); id. § 49 
cmt. b; see also Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U. 
Pitt. L. Rev. 225, 285 n.257 (2005); cf. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652C, 652H 
(1977) (providing that the measure of damages for an invasion of privacy is the harm to 
the plaintiff’s privacy resulting from the invasion, the mental distress proved, and special 
damages resulting from the invasion). 
2 978 F.2d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 1992). 
3 Id. at 1097. 
4 Id. at 1103–06. 
5 737 F. Supp. 826, 828, 836–37 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
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aging youth to stay in school and avoid all use of alcohol and illegal 
substances.6 
 Moreover, in the age of “reality television” the line between celeb-
rity and non-celebrity has become especially fuzzy. Today more than 
ever before, ordinary people have the opportunity to garner their so-
called “fifteen minutes” of fame.7 Although these individuals may bene-
fit from this exposure, one downside is that “short-term” celebrities are 
more likely to be the subject of right-of-publicity violations generally 
and dignity harms in particular, as compared to people lacking any ce-
lebrity status. 
 Much ink has been spilled over the intersection between the right 
of publicity and the First Amendment.8 To date, however, neither 
courts nor commentators have focused specifically on how the exis-
tence of dignity harms should impact the analysis in these cases, and so 
this Article attempts to open a dialogue on this point. For purposes of 
this work, I accept the right of publicity’s existence as a given, and 
therefore do not argue for or against the right. Instead, I propose a way 
of thinking about those publicity cases where damage to human dignity 
is a prime—or even the prime—concern of the plaintiff. 
 Part I of this Article examines the relationship between causes of 
action such as privacy, defamation, and the right of publicity that can 
involve harm to a plaintiff’s dignity.9 It then explores how conflict can 
arise in connection with these types of claims and the First Amend-
ment.10 Part II discusses the current tests courts have used to determine 
                                                                                                                      
6 Id. at 828. 
7 This reference is derived from Andy Warhol’s famous quip: “In the future everybody 
will be world famous for fifteen minutes.” The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations 803 
(Elizabeth Knowles ed., 5th ed. 1999); see also Gloria Franke, Note, The Right of Publicity vs. the 
First Amendment: Will One Test Ever Capture the Starring Role?, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 945, 989 (2006) 
(noting how the Internet and reality programming have fostered “the democratization of 
celebrity”). 
8 See, e.g., Stephen R. Barnett, First Amendment Limits on the Right of Publicity, 30 Tort & 
Ins. L.J. 635 (1995); F. Jay Dougherty, All the World’s Not a Stooge: The “Transformativeness” 
Test for Analyzing a First Amendment Defense to a Right of Publicity Claim Against Distribution of a 
Work of Art, 27 Colum. J.L. & Arts 1 (2003); Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, Privacy, 
Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88 Yale L.J. 1577 (1979); Roberta 
Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment: A Property and Liability Rule 
Analysis, 70 Ind. L.J. 47 (1994); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 
Hous. L. Rev. 903 (2003); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Fitting Publicity Rights into Intellec-
tual Property and Free Speech Theory: Sam, You Made the Pants Too Long!, 10 DePaul-LCA J. 
Art & Ent. L. 283 (2000); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Money as a Thumb on the Constitu-
tional Scale: Weighing Speech Against Publicity Rights, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1503 (2009). 
9 See infra notes 13–43 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 44–58 and accompanying text. 
1348 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 50:1345 
how the right of publicity specifically should co-exist with the First 
Amendment, and concludes that none of these tests are suitable in the 
context of publicity claims involving dignity harms.11 Part III develops a 
more suitable framework for evaluating such claims.12 
I. Dignity Harms, the Right of Publicity, and  
the First Amendment 
 More than forty years ago, Edward Bloustein emphasized the im-
portance of dignity in his classic explanation of the inviolate personality 
that “defines man’s essence as a unique and self-determining being.”13 
In his work, Bloustein argued that the four distinct invasions of the 
right of privacy described by Dean Prosser14 all share a concern with 
safeguarding human dignity.15 In discussing one of these strands, which 
would become known as the right of publicity, Bloustein posited that 
commercial uses of a person’s name or photograph are actionable be-
cause of the injury caused “to the sense of personal dignity” by dimin-
ishing that individual’s freedom.16 This invasion amounts to “a wrong-
ful exercise of dominion over another” even if the use was “subjectively 
appreciated” or profitable.17 Similarly, Bloustein saw “false light” privacy 
invasions as impairing a person’s freedom to maintain her individual 
identity.18 He observed that “[p]ublishing a photograph in a ‘false 
light’ serves the same function in constituting the wrong as does a use 
of the photograph for advertising purposes.”19 Bloustein also noted a 
                                                                                                                      
11 See infra notes 59–119 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 120–149 and accompanying text. 
13 Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 
39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962, 971 (1964) (defining key components of the inviolate personality as 
“the individual’s independence, dignity and integrity”). According to Daniel Solove, 
Bloustein’s conception of privacy is grounded in personhood and individuality. See Daniel 
J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1087, 1116 (2002) (critiquing numerous 
traditional conceptions of privacy and proposing that privacy be conceptualized in situa-
tion specific terms). 
14 These strands are: 1) Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his 
private affairs; 2) Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; 3) 
Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; 4) Appropriation, for 
the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 
48 Cal. L. Rev. 383, 389 (1960). 
15 Bloustein, supra note 13, at 974. 
16 Id. at 988 (noting that such uses turn individuals into commodities and make them 
serve the economic interests of others). 
17 Id. at 990. 
18 Id. at 991–93. 
19 Id. at 992. Bloustein also expressly noted that many of the false light cases also in-
volved the use of a person’s identity for commercial purposes. Id. 
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trend in defamation law to include protection against “aspects of per-
sonal humiliation and degradation.”20 The significance of Bloustein’s 
analysis for purposes of this Article is his recognition of the dignity in-
terests inherent in privacy, defamation and publicity actions. 
 The case law contemporaneous with and subsequent to Bloustein’s 
article supports his position that privacy, defamation, and publicity ac-
tions contain inherent dignity interests. Nevertheless, the growth and 
often-overlapping nature of these legal doctrines have sometimes ob-
scured these dignity interests, especially with regard to the right of pub-
licity. This failure to recognize dignity interests in the right of publicity 
has important repercussions when publicity interests conflict with First 
Amendment rights. 
A. Dignity Interests in Defamation and Privacy Law 
 Privacy and defamation law explicitly recognize dignity interests. In 
the 1964 case New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, which was decided the same 
year the Bloustein article was published, the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that damages for defamation could not be sustained by politicians ab-
sent a showing that the remarks at issue were false and defamatory and 
made with “actual malice,” meaning with knowledge of their falsity or 
with reckless disregard for the truth.21 Three years later, in Time, Inc. v. 
Hill, the Court invoked the same “actual malice” standard in an action 
for damages under New York’s right of privacy statute.22 Hill involved a 
claim brought by a private person against Life Magazine for falsely re-
porting that a particular play accurately portrayed the experience suf-
fered by the plaintiff and his family when they were held hostage by 
escaped convicts.23 In a footnote relevant to the focus of this Article, 
the Court compared “the interest protected in those ‘privacy’ cases 
which focus upon the falsity of the matter to that protected in cases of 
libel and slander—injury to the reputation.”24 The Hill Court further 
noted that many privacy cases could have been brought as “libel per 
quod” actions.25 
                                                                                                                      
20 Id. at 993. 
21 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
22 385 U.S. 374, 387 (1967). 
23 Id. at 376–78. 
24 Id. at 385 n.9. 
25 Id. (noting also that “all libel cases concern public exposure by false matter, but the 
primary harm being compensated is damage to reputation” whereas privacy cases typically 
concern mental distress, “although injury to reputation may be an element bearing on 
such damage”). Subsequently, the Supreme Court held that the actual malice standard is 
 
1350 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 50:1345 
 The line between privacy and defamation is indeed fuzzy. As 
Bloustein observed, “[t]he slur on reputation is an aspect of the viola-
tion of individual integrity.”26 Thus, defamation cases may also trigger 
“assault[s] on individual personality and dignity” characteristic of pri-
vacy violations.27 With respect to the right of publicity, however, these 
dignity interests have not been as readily recognized. 
B. Dignity Interests and the Development of the Right of Publicity 
 No clear line of demarcation exists between privacy and publicity. 
In the landmark 1905 decision, Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance 
Co., the Supreme Court of Georgia upheld the plaintiff’s invasion of 
privacy claim against an insurance company that had utilized the plain-
tiff’s picture, without his consent, in an advertisement for insurance.28 
The court observed that because the “form and features of the plaintiff 
are his own,” the defendant invaded “the rights of his person” by dis-
playing them in public for advertising purposes.29 The court’s decision 
was an early precursor to the right of publicity. 
 Subsequent decisions in invasion of privacy suits explicitly recog-
nized an individual’s proprietary interest in her name and likeness.30 
Most of the plaintiffs in these early cases were private individuals seek-
ing compensation for injuries to their feelings caused by defendants’ 
appropriation of their likenesses. Instead of recognizing dignity harms, 
however, these courts were compelled to focus on the property interests 
in names and likenesses to counter the defendants’ arguments that the 
law does not afford relief for invasion of privacy unless such an intru-
sion is accompanied by injury to, or interference with, a person’s prop-
                                                                                                                      
applicable to actions by public figures and officials based on intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress when the publication at issue could not reasonably be interpreted as stating 
actual facts about the subject involved. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56–57 
(1988). 
26 Bloustein, supra note 13, at 991. 
27 See id. 
28 50 S.E. 68, 68–69, 81 (Ga. 1905). 
29 Id. at 79; cf. Bloustein, supra note 13, at 985 (noting that in Pavesich, “[t]here was no 
suggestion . . . that the plaintiff sought to vindicate a proprietary interest, that he sought 
recompense for the commercial value of the use of his name”). 
30 See, e.g., Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076, 1079 (Mo. Ct. App. 1911) (holding that 
an individual has a property right in his picture); Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 67 
A. 392, 394 (N.J. Ch. 1907) (“[I]t is difficult to understand why the peculiar cast of one’s 
features is not also one’s property, and why its pecuniary value, if it has one, does not be-
long to its owner, rather than to the person seeking to make an unauthorized use of it.”). 
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erty.31 These privacy decisions thus supported the proposition that 
those wishing to capitalize upon another’s name or likeness for adver-
tising purposes should not be free to do so without compensating the 
principal. These cases also reveal a connection between hurt feelings 
and monetary relief, but the opinions themselves were framed in terms 
of property-based law. 
 The right of publicity as a legal theory distinct from privacy was 
first explicitly recognized in 1953. In Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps 
Chewing Gum, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
declared that an individual has, independent of the right of privacy, a 
right in the publicity value of her photograph.32 The photographs at 
issue in Haelan depicted baseball players, individuals with obvious ce-
lebrity status.33 
 The development of a separate right of publicity was significant 
because it thwarted the tendency to construe an individual’s celebrity 
status as a waiver of the right of privacy.34 For example, in the 1941 case, 
O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
denied recovery to a renowned football player for invasion of his pri-
vacy when the defendant company published his picture, without con-
sent, in the 1939 Pabst Football Calendar.35 The court predicated its 
holding, in part, on the plaintiff’s status as a public personality who 
constantly sought publicity in other contexts.36 Absent from the court’s 
                                                                                                                      
31 See, e.g., Munden, 134 S.W. at 1077; Edison, 67 A. at 394–95. Recognition of the prop-
erty right inherent in names and likenesses prompted these courts to recognize further 
that any value inherent in an individual’s likeness belongs exclusively to that individual. 
See, e.g., Munden, 134 S.W. at 1079; Edison, 67 A. at 394–95. 
32 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953). For discussions of some pre-Haelan decisions that 
implicitly recognize a right of publicity, see Harold R. Gordon, Right of Property in Name, 
Likeness, Personality and History, 55 Nw. U. L. Rev. 553, 560–65 (1960); Melville B. Nimmer, 
The Right of Publicity, 19 Law & Contemp. Probs. 203, 218–21 (1954). 
33 See Haelan, 202 F.2d at 867. 
34 See Nimmer, supra note 32, at 204–10. At least one court observed explicitly that a 
private citizen can rely upon the right of privacy to prevent the appropriation of her pho-
tograph for commercial purposes, whereas a public figure or celebrity has a “similar” right 
of publicity. Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 
296 S.E.2d 697, 703 (Ga. 1982). This distinction, however, is not necessarily the norm be-
cause celebrities, like other people, can recover for mental distress resulting from the un-
authorized commercial use of their identities. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Com-
petition § 46 cmt. b (1995); see also supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text. In addition, 
private citizens have prevailed under the right of publicity for commercial misappropria-
tions. See, e.g., Fanelle v. LoJack Corp., No. CIV.A. 99-4292, 2000 WL 1801270, at *10 (E.D. 
Pa. Dec. 7, 2000) (noting that the majority view is that non-celebrities can bring a cause of 
action based on the right of publicity). 
35 124 F.2d 167, 168–70 (5th Cir. 1941). 
36 Id. at 168–69. 
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rationale, however, was a recognition of the possibility that the plaintiff 
might have experienced an assault to his dignity by virtue of the defen-
dant’s particular use of his identity.37 Had early decisions such as 
O’Brien sufficiently appreciated the dignity interests at stake in privacy 
cases involving unauthorized commercial appropriations of celebrities’ 
personas, the case law might have taken a completely different course.38 
 Significantly, right of publicity case law reveals a marked lack of 
appreciation for the relevance of assaults to a plaintiff’s dignity. This 
tendency is problematic. On a conceptual level, identity is a concept 
completely intrinsic to the individual to whom it is attached and there-
fore properly subject to that individual’s control.39 Private individuals, 
no less than celebrities, manifest associational choices reflecting their 
character and values, choices that can be viewed as “the text” of their 
                                                                                                                      
37 See McKenna, supra note 1, at 243. 
38 Cf. Bloustein, supra note 13, at 989 (“[T]here is really no ‘right to publicity’; there is 
only a right, under some circumstances, to command a commercial price for abandoning 
privacy.”). 
From the outset, confusion surrounded the application of the right of privacy and the 
right of publicity, particularly in instances in which celebrities were suing for only invasion 
of privacy and non-celebrities were seeking compensation for the appropriation of their 
identities. This confusion regarding the applicability of privacy and publicity is com-
pounded by the reality that in several states, such as New York, Nebraska, Virginia, and 
Wisconsin, privacy statutes make actionable the unauthorized appropriation of personas 
for all individuals. Moreover, state statutes typically are sufficiently broad to incorporate 
both commercial and personal interests. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competi-
tion § 46 cmt. b (1995). The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, the 
home of many such lawsuits, specifically held that the right of publicity is subsumed in the 
state statutory right of privacy. See Ryan v. Volpone Stamp Co., 107 F. Supp. 2d 369, 391 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (interpreting N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 50–51 (McKinney 2006)). 
If the line blurs between privacy and defamation, on the one hand, and between pri-
vacy and publicity, on the other, it should not come as a surprise that the line between 
publicity and defamation also is fuzzy. David Welkowitz and Tyler Ochoa have invoked the 
term “stealth defamation” to describe those actions in which plaintiffs invoke the right of 
publicity to sidestep the constitutional limitations on defamation claims. See David S. 
Welkowitz & Tyler T. Ochoa, The Terminator as Eraser: How Arnold Schwarzenegger Used the 
Right of Publicity to Terminate Non-Defamatory Political Speech, 45 Santa Clara L. Rev. 651, 
652–55 (2005). According to conventional wisdom, publicity cases involve a property in-
terest, unlike defamation cases. See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players 
Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 968 (10th Cir. 1996). Still, courts have granted injunctions in defama-
tion cases involving patent infringement and other matters when they perceive the exis-
tence of a property interest at stake. See Stephen A. Siegel, Injunctions for Defamation, Juries, 
and the Clarifying Lens of 1868, 56 Buff. L. Rev. 655, 724–26 (2008) (discussing post-
Reconstruction era defamation cases involving patent disputes, labor boycotts, and strikes 
where a property interest was recognized and relied on as a basis for injunctive relief). 
39 See Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 Duke L.J. 
383, 431 (1999). 
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identities.40 Mark McKenna has termed this interest one of “autono-
mous self-definition” and argues that “every individual should be able 
to control uses of her identity that interfere with her ability to define 
her own public character.”41 According to this perspective, an individ-
ual’s persona requires protection, not just from economic encroach-
ment, but also from damage to the human spirit as a result of unau-
thorized uses of the persona deemed objectionable on moral grounds. 
The interest served in many privacy, publicity, and even defamation 
cases embodies a “spiritual” quality rather than an interest in property 
or even reputation.42 There is value to acknowledging the “conceptual 
unity” of these cases.43 
C. Right of Publicity and the First Amendment 
 The absence of an express consideration of damage to human 
dignity muddies the analysis in cases where the right of publicity is al-
leged to conflict with the First Amendment. Consider comedian Jackie 
Mason’s suit against Jews for Jesus.44 Mason sued the group based on 
the use of his name, likeness, and act in a pamphlet featuring a carica-
ture of Mason on the front and a riff on one of his routines inside.45 
Mason is an ordained rabbi and a founding member of Jews Against 
Anti-Christian Defamation.46 He once rode down Fifth Avenue in New 
York with a banner proclaiming “Jews for ‘It’s OK To Say Merry 
Christmas,’” but he is not a Jew for Jesus.47 He claimed that the group’s 
use of his attributes and personality to attract attention and converts 
had damaged him to an “incalculable degree.”48 Mason brought the 
suit under New York’s privacy statute, which requires that the use be 
                                                                                                                      
40 See McKenna, supra note 1, at 229. 
41 Id. at 285. 
42 See Bloustein, supra note 13, at 1002. 
43 See id. at 1004 (“Conceptual unity [of the law] is not only fulfilling in itself, however; 
it is also an instrument of legal development.”). 
44 Mason v. Jews for Jesus, No. 06 Civ. 6433(RMB), 2006 WL 3230279, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 8, 2006); see also Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Soul of Creativity: Forging a 
Moral Rights Law for the United States (forthcoming 2010). 
45 Id. 
46 See Anemona Hartocollis, To Settle Suit, Jews for Jesus Apologizes to Jackie Mason, N.Y. 
Times, Dec. 5, 2006, at B2; Press Release, Jews Against Anti-Christian Defamation, Jackie 
Mason Will Say “Merry Christmas” on 5th Avenue (Dec. 15, 2005) (available at http://www. 
jews4fairness.org/pr121405.php. 
47 See Hartocollis, supra note 46; Press Release, Jews Against Anti-Christian Defamation, 
supra note 46. 
48 Dareh Gregorian, Jackie: “Jesus” Heist!—Comic Sues over Ad, N.Y. Post, Aug. 25, 2006, 
at 19; see also Mason, 2006 WL 3230279, at *2 n.2. 
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“for advertising or for trade” in order to be actionable.49 The court de-
nied his motion for a preliminary injunction.50 
 Similarly, in Nussenzweig v. DiCorcia, a 2006 New York Supreme 
Court decision, the defendant, a well-known professional photogra-
pher, took a series of candid photographs in Times Square without the 
permission of his subjects, which he compiled into a particular collec-
tion.51 One of the photographs he used was of the plaintiff, a Hasidic 
Jew who believes that the defendant’s use of his image violates the Sec-
ond Commandment’s prohibition against graven images.52 The suit was 
also brought under New York’s privacy statute.53 The court accepted 
the defendant’s argument that art is exempt from the privacy statute as 
protected speech, noting that “[a] profit motive in itself does not nec-
essarily compel a conclusion that art has been used for trade pur-
poses.”54 
 In Arrington v. New York Times Co., a 1982 New York Court of Ap-
peals decision upon which Nussenzweig relied, the plaintiff was an Afri-
can-American man whose picture, but not name, appeared on the 
cover of the New York Times Magazine in connection with an article 
about the expanding black middle class in America.55 The plaintiff dis-
agreed with the views in the article and alleged that he and readers who 
knew him found it “insulting, degrading, distorting and disparaging,” 
thus subjecting him to public scorn and ridicule.56 Here too the court 
held in favor of the main defendant, the New York Times Company.57 
Both Nussenzweig and Arrington upheld First Amendment protections in 
the face of “deeply and spiritually offensive” uses, thus demonstrating 
that speech causing emotional harm to particular individuals cannot be 
regulated in all contexts.58 
                                                                                                                      
49 Mason, 2006 WL 3230279, at *1, *4–*5; see also N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 50–51 
(McKinney 2006). 
50 Mason, 2006 WL 3230279, at *6. Mason and Jews for Jesus later settled out of court, 
with Jews for Jesus issuing an apology but providing no monetary settlement. Hartocollis, 
supra note 46. 
51 78 U.S.P.Q.2d 1123, 1126 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006). 
52 Id. at 1127. 
53 Id. at 1124. 
54 Id. at 1129. 
55 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1320 (N.Y. 1982). 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 1323. The court ruled that the action could properly proceed against several 
other defendants, however, including the photographer who took the picture and the 
photographic agency who sold it to the New York Times Magazine. Id. at 1323–24. 
58 Nussenzweig, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1128–30; accord Arrington, 434 N.E.2d at 1321–23. 
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 Nussenzweig and Arrington differ from the case involving Jackie Ma-
son in that they involve a less prominent focus on persona. In both Nus-
senzweig and Arrington, the references to the plaintiffs’ personas were 
much less direct because the plaintiffs were not celebrities and only 
their pictures and not their names were used. Moreover, Nussenzweig 
involved an image in an art collection and Arrington involved a photo-
graph in a major news publication, while Mason concerned a proselytiz-
ing religious advertisement. Nevertheless, all three cases involved a con-
flict between the right of publicity and the First Amendment wherein a 
dignity harm was the focus. In each case, the court failed to provide an 
appropriate analytical framework. The following Part illustrates that 
this failure was the result of the judiciary’s formulation of, and reliance 
upon, tests that are of limited value with respect to situations involving 
dignity damage. 
II. Limitations of the Proposed Balancing Tests 
 The only U.S. Supreme Court case to focus on the right of public-
ity, the 1977 case Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., heavily in-
fluenced not only the scope of the doctrine but also its interface with 
the First Amendment.59 Zacchini involved an entertainer who per-
formed as a “human cannonball.”60 A reporter for the defendant 
broadcasting company used a movie camera to record the plaintiff’s 
performance at a local fair after having been denied permission to re-
cord the previous day, and the defendant aired the clip of the entire 
performance on the evening news.61 Plaintiff sued for damages pursu-
ant to the Ohio state law right of publicity.62 The Supreme Court held 
that the First and Fourteenth Amendments did not immunize the de-
fendant from paying damages.63 
 Two things about Zacchini are especially noteworthy for purposes 
of this Article. First, the Court was very careful to situate the right of 
publicity as a cause of action independent of actions based on affronts 
to human dignity.64 A careful reading of this case underscores that the 
Court focused on the fact that the television station was interfering with 
the plaintiff’s business opportunities—the case was steeped in eco-
                                                                                                                      
59 See 433 U.S. 562, 562 (1977). 
60 Id. at 563. 
61 Id. at 563–64. 
62 Id. at 565. 
63 Id. at 565–66. 
64 See id. at 573, 575–76. 
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nomic considerations.65 No fewer than three times did the Court em-
phasize that the plaintiff was seeking damages and not injunctive re-
lief.66 Second, the Court emphasized that it believed the reputational 
false light invasion of privacy tort to be completely distinct from the 
economic right of publicity.67 As a result, the Court rejected the actual 
malice standard for liability applied in earlier cases, such as Time, Inc. v. 
Hill.68 Instead, the Court invoked a balancing test to determine the ap-
propriate navigation between the right of publicity and the First 
Amendment.69 The invocation of such an approach has been signifi-
cant because lower courts have interpreted Zacchini as requiring a bal-
ancing of the right of publicity against First Amendment considera-
tions.70 Moreover, given that Zacchini involved the unauthorized 
appropriation of a performer’s entire act, it has been easy to interpret 
the Court’s holding as limited to the narrow set of facts at issue.71 
 Courts subsequent to Zacchini have invoked a variety of balancing 
tests for determining how the right of publicity should be applied in 
cases presenting First Amendment challenges. There are at least five 
basic approaches: (1) the transformative use test;72 (2) the predomi-
nant purpose test;73 (3) an actual malice standard;74 (4) the related-
ness/Restatement approach;75 and (5) a general ad hoc balancing ap-
                                                                                                                      
65 See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573, 575–76. 
66 See id. at 565, 573–74, 578. 
67 Id. at 571–76. 
68 Id. at 570–75; see also supra notes 22–25 and accompanying text. 
69 See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 574–78 (noting that broadcasting the entire performance 
would have a “substantial threat to the economic value of that performance,” and suggest-
ing that the television station could have reported on the performance without broadcast-
ing it in its entirety). According to the Court, “[w]herever the line in particular situations 
is to be drawn between media reports that are protected and those that are not, we are 
quite sure that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize the media when 
they broadcast a performer’s entire act without his consent.” Id. at 574–75. 
70 See, e.g., C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 
L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2872 (2008); see also infra 
notes 103–118 and accompanying text. See generally David L. Lange & H. Jefferson Pow-
ell, No Law: Intellectual Property in the Image of an Absolute First Amendment 
(2009) (offering a critique of the modern approach to First Amendment conflicts with 
intellectual property interests, including the right of publicity). 
71 See 2 J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 8:25, at 134 
(2d ed. 2008). This interpretation is bolstered by the Zacchini Court’s own language in the 
case. See 433 U.S. at 573 n.10, 576 (noting that the case of appropriation was particularly 
strong as the defendant used the plaintiff’s entire act). 
72 See infra notes 78–85 and accompanying text. 
73 See infra notes 86–89 and accompanying text. 
74 See infra notes 90–95 and accompanying text. 
75 See infra notes 96–101 and accompanying text. 
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proach.76 Significantly, there is little uniformity or wide-spread adher-
ence among courts with respect to any of these tests, and the Supreme 
Court recently declined to provide clarity by denying certiorari in a 
relevant case.77 Regardless, all of these tests are of limited use in right of 
publicity cases involving dignity harms because they focus on the nature 
of the defendant’s use rather than the actual harm to the plaintiff. The 
following discussion explores these tests and their limitations in this 
context. 
A. The Transformative Use Test 
 In the 2001 case, Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 
the defendant-artist sold lithographs and t-shirts bearing the likeness of 
the Three Stooges reproduced from a charcoal drawing he had made.78 
The plaintiff, the registered owner of all the rights to the Three 
Stooges, sued the defendant under the California right of publicity 
statute, seeking damages and injunctive relief.79 Drawing on the first 
prong of the fair use doctrine in copyright law, the Supreme Court of 
California developed its “transformative test,” which asks whether the 
new work “adds something new, with a further purpose or different 
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or mes-
sage.”80 The Supreme Court of California also recognized a subsidiary 
inquiry that focuses on whether “the marketability and economic value 
of the challenged work [is] derive[d] primarily from the fame of the 
celebrity depicted.”81 If the economic value of the challenged speech is 
derived primarily from some source other than the depicted celebrity’s 
fame, “it may be presumed that sufficient transformative elements are 
present to warrant First Amendment protection.”82 Using these criteria, 
                                                                                                                      
76 See infra notes 102–119 and accompanying text. 
77 See Major League Baseball Advanced Media v. C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc., 128 
S. Ct. 2872 (2008); see also infra notes 103–118 and accompanying text. 
78 21 P.3d 797, 800–01 (Cal. 2001). 
79 Id. at 799–800. 
80 Id. at 808 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)). 
When artistic expression takes the form of a literal depiction or imitation of 
celebrity for commercial gain, directly trespassing on the right of publicity 
without adding significant expression beyond that trespass, the state law in-
terest in protecting the fruits of artistic labor outweighs the expressive inter-
ests of the imitative artist. 
Id. 
81 Id. at 810. 
82 Id. 
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the Supreme Court of California held that the right of publicity out-
weighed the defendant’s First Amendment interests.83 
 The problem with the “transformative use” test is that it takes the 
focus off the alleged damage to the plaintiff’s dignity and instead places 
it on the nature and impact of the defendant’s actions. Why should the 
nature of the defendant’s transformation matter if the real question is 
whether the law should tolerate a particular violation of the plaintiff’s 
dignity for the sake of the First Amendment? Moreover, this test is con-
ceptually off the mark because it is derived from a gloss on copyright’s 
fair use doctrine, which is concerned with determining the circum-
stances under which uncompensated copying should be allowed.84 Fair 
use, like most of copyright law, is concerned with calibrating the opti-
mal economic incentives for maximizing creative output. When a plain-
tiff is trying to vindicate damage to her dignity, such economic incen-
tive is not the primary consideration.85 
B. Predominant Use 
 In the 2003 case, Doe v. TCI Cablevision, Tony Twist, a former pro-
fessional hockey player, sued the creators of the Spawn comic book for 
misappropriation of name and defamation based on one of the charac-
ters in the comic having a similar name to Twist.86 In crafting its “pre-
dominant use” test, the Supreme Court of Missouri held: 
If a product is being sold that predominantly exploits the 
commercial value of an individual’s identity, that product 
should be held to violate the right of publicity and not be pro-
tected by the First Amendment, even if there is some “expres-
                                                                                                                      
83 Id. at 811. According to the court, there were no transformative or creative contri-
butions by defendant; his lithographs and t-shirts depicted a literal likeness of the Three 
Stooges. See id. Also, the court held that “the marketability and economic value of [defen-
dant’s] work derives primarily from the fame of the celebrities depicted.” Id. Thus, the 
court did not recognize any free speech protection for the defendant’s t-shirts and litho-
graphs. See id. 
For another application of the “transformative” test, see Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 
473, 480 (Cal. 2003) (distinguishing Comedy III Productions and holding that defendant’s 
comic books were protected by the First Amendment because they depicted “fanciful, crea-
tive characters” rather than literal likenesses of the plaintiffs). 
84 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578–79. 
85 For a critique of the transformative use test, see Volokh, supra note 8, at 917–23. 
86 110 S.W.3d 363, 365–66 (Mo. 2003). The trial court dismissed the defamation claim 
early in the litigation, but it allowed the misappropriation of name claim to go to trial. Id. 
at 365. After the jury reached its verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the misappropriation 
claim, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict, and the plaintiff appealed. Id. 
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sive” content in it that might qualify as “speech” in other cir-
cumstances.87 
 Thus, the focus of the predominant use test is whether a defen-
dant’s speech is primarily commercial or primarily expressive.88 As with 
the transformative use test, the predominant use test is fundamentally 
inadequate to protect dignity harms. Any test focusing on the defen-
dant’s intent is irrelevant to the impact on the plaintiff’s dignity interest 
because uses that are commercial, expressive, or in-between can signifi-
cantly damage a plaintiff’s dignity.89 
C. The Actual Malice Test 
 In 2001, in Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adopted an “actual malice” test for de-
termining whether First Amendment or right of publicity concerns 
should prevail.90 In Hoffman, defendant-magazine published an article 
                                                                                                                      
87 Id. at 374 (quoting from Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the 
Right of Publicity-Free Speech Interface, 23 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 471, 500 (2003)). The court 
determined that if “the predominant purpose of the product is to make an expressive 
comment on or about a celebrity, the expressive values could be given greater weight.” Id. 
(internal citation omitted). The court also criticized the transformative test for “giv[ing] 
too little consideration to the fact that many uses of a person’s name and identity have 
both expressive and commercial components” and under that test, “the transformation or 
fictionalized characterization of a person’s celebrity status is not actionable even if its sole 
purpose is the commercial use of that person’s name and identity.” Id. 
After articulating its new test, the Supreme Court of Missouri remanded the case for a 
new trial. Id. at 376. On remand, the jury awarded Twist $15 million in damages, and the 
Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed. Doe v. McFarlane, 207 S.W.3d 52, 56, 76 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2006). 
88 This test has been criticized insofar as “it does not explain how courts should de-
termine the predominant purpose of a contested device that is both highly expressive and 
obviously commercial.” Recent Case, Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003), 
cert. denied sub nom. Twist v. McFarlane, 2004 WL 46675 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2004) (No. 03-615), 
117 Harv. L. Rev. 1275, 1280 (2004). In addition, the test requires courts to determine 
legal protection by measuring literary and expressive value, something courts have been 
reluctant to do. Id. at 1281; see, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 
239, 251–52 (1903). 
89 Although the defamation claim was dismissed, the facts of the Tony Twist litigation 
suggest that a morally based harm might have been lurking in the background. The char-
acter, Anthony “Tony Twist” Twistelli, was “a Mafia don whose list of evil deeds includes 
multiple murders, abduction of children and sex with prostitutes.” TCI Cablevision, 110 
S.W.3d at 366; see Welkowitz & Ochoa, supra note 38, at 656–57 (discussing case as an ex-
ample of “the right of publicity . . . being used as an alternative to defamation”). Nonethe-
less, the evidence presented on the issue of damages suggests that the plaintiff’s concern 
was also largely economic in nature. See TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 367. 
90 255 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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on fashion that contained photographs of actors.91 One photograph 
showed Dustin Hoffman in the movie Tootsie, but rather than using the 
original image, the magazine replaced Hoffman’s body with the body 
of a model wearing a dress.92 Even though this case shortly followed 
Comedy III Productions, the court did not use the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia’s transformative use test or a balancing test. Rather, the Ninth 
Circuit used the “actual malice standard” applied in defamation cases 
since New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, because it believed defendant’s 
conduct, as noncommercial speech about a public figure, was entitled 
to full First Amendment protection.93 The Ninth Circuit concluded 
that Hoffman did not prove actual malice by clear and convincing evi-
dence.94 
 The Ninth Circuit’s application of the actual malice test was criti-
cized by the Supreme Court of Missouri in TCI Cablevision on the 
ground that “Zacchini stands for the proposition that the actual malice 
standard does not apply to the tort of appropriation of a right of pub-
licity.”95 This is correct to the extent that the actual malice test is not 
the appropriate test to apply in these cases. Here again, the actual mal-
ice test focuses on the defendant’s intent and this emphasis obscures 
the true nature of the inquiry which concerns damage to the plaintiff’s 
dignity. 
D. The Relatedness/Restatement Approach 
 The Third Restatement of Unfair Competition suggests yet another test 
for determining when the First Amendment should trump the right of 
publicity. The Restatement provides that “if the name or likeness is used 
                                                                                                                      
91 Id. at 1183. 
92 Id. 
93 See id. at 1186. Thus, the court inquired whether the defendant “acted ‘with reckless 
disregard for the truth’ or a ‘high degree of awareness of probable falsity.’” Id. (quoting 
Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 667 (1989)); cf. Martin H. 
Redish, Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism and the Twilight Zone of Viewpoint Dis-
crimination, 41 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 67, 75 n.27 (2007) (arguing that false commercial speech 
should “be treated fungibly with false non-commercial speech,” thus triggering an “actual 
malice” standard of protection). 
94 Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1189. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district 
court. Id. 
95 TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 373 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Hustler 
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988)); see Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 574 (noting that 
New York Times Co. and its progeny “emphasize the protection extended to the press by the 
First Amendment in defamation cases, particularly when suit is brought by a public official 
or a public figure. None of them involve an alleged appropriation by the press of a right of 
publicity existing under state law.”). 
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solely to attract attention to a work that is not related to the identified 
person, the user may be subject to liability for a use of the other’s iden-
tity in advertising.”96 Therefore, this “relatedness” test “protects the use 
of another person’s name or identity in a work that is ‘related to’ that 
person.”97 If the work is not related to the identified person, the right of 
publicity interests will outweigh the First Amendment interests in using 
the persona.98 Moreover, a privilege to use another’s identity under the 
Restatement may be lost if the work contains substantial falsehoods.99 
 In discussing the Restatement’s approach, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit has observed that the Restatement invokes a “rule 
analogous to the rule of fair use in copyright law.”100 In its 2003 deci-
sion, ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., the court specifically noted that 
the Restatement calls for an analysis of the “substantiality and market ef-
fect of the use of the celebrity’s image . . . in light of the informational 
and creative content of the defendant’s use.”101 By emphasizing the na-
ture of the defendant’s use rather than the existence of dignity damage 
to the plaintiff by virtue of the defendant’s use, the Restatement’s ap-
proach also fails to provide an appropriate means of considering what 
is truly at stake in publicity cases involving dignity damage. 
E. Ad Hoc Balancing 
 Several cases have employed an ad hoc balancing approach to re-
solve right of publicity and First Amendment conflicts.102 One example 
                                                                                                                      
96 See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 47 cmt. c (1995). 
97 TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 373. The list of “related uses” includes: 
[T]he use of a person’s name or likeness in news reporting . . . use in enter-
tainment and other creative works, including both fiction and nonfiction . . . 
[use] as part of an article published in a fan magazine or in a feature story 
broadcast on an entertainment program . . . dissemination of an unauthor-
ized print or broadcast biography . . . [and] [u]se of another’s identity in a 
novel, play or motion picture . . . . 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 47 cmt. c (1995). 
98 See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 47 cmt. c (1995). 
99 See id. 
100 ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 937 (6th Cir. 2003); see Restatement 
(Third) of Unfair Competition § 47 cmt. d (1995). 
101 ETW, 332 F.3d at 937; see Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 47 
cmt. d (1995). 
102 Professor McCarthy describes the ad hoc balancing approach as “no more than a 
case-by-case weighing of competing values and interests to determine whether ‘speech’ in 
a particular case is deserving of constitutional immunity from legal liability.” 2 McCarthy, 
supra note 71, § 8:23, at 131. He is highly critical of such an approach. See id. (“[Ad hoc 
balancing] seemingly amounts to no more than an ‘I know it when I see it’ approach. . . . 
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is ETW, where the court held that a sports artist’s print incorporating 
Tiger Woods’ victory at the 1997 Masters Tournament was entitled to 
First Amendment protection.103 In so holding, the court invoked an 
analytical framework combining elements of the “actual malice” stan-
dard used in Hoffman, the “transformative” test from Comedy III Produc-
tions, and the Restatement’s formulation.104 In addition, a prominent 
component of the court’s focus was the 1996 U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit decision, Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Play-
ers Association.105 In Cardtoons, the court held that Cardtoons’ First 
Amendment rights to produce parody baseball trading cards out-
weighed the players’ right of publicity.106 The court in Cardtoons used an 
ad hoc balancing test after it acknowledged that the trading cards in 
fact infringed on the association’s publicity rights.107 
 Most recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in-
voked an ad hoc balancing test in its 2007 decision, C.B.C. Distribution 
& Marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P.108 C.B.C. 
Distribution and Marketing, Inc. (“CBC”), a producer of fantasy base-
ball games, sought a declaratory judgment that it had a First Amend-
ment right to make an unlicensed use of the names and statistics of ma-
jor league players in its games.109 A competing company that had been 
granted the license to use such information filed a counterclaim, argu-
ing that CBC violated the right of publicity belonging to the major 
league baseball players and their association.110 The court held that al-
though the players provided sufficient evidence to establish a right of 
publicity claim under state law, CBC’s First Amendment rights super-
seded the players’ right of publicity.111 
 Although the courts in both Cardtoons and C.B.C. Distribution dis-
cussed the relevance of non-economic harms, neither court focused 
specifically on how damage to a publicity plaintiff’s dignity interest 
                                                                                                                      
[T]here is no rule to be applied, there is only the unrestrained and unpredictable judicial 
balancing of competing values.”). 
103 332 F.3d at 918–919, 925, 938. 
104 See id. at 930–31, 933–38. 
105 See id. at 932–33, 936–38. 
106 95 F.3d 959, 976 (10th Cir. 1996). 
107 Id. at 968, 970–76. 
108 505 F.3d at 823. 
109 Id. at 820. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 824. Several key facts were critical to the court’s holding: the information 
used by CBC was already in the public domain; courts have “recognized the public value of 
information about the game of baseball and its players;” and the economic interests of the 
players were not implicated, as the players were already highly compensated. Id. at 823–24. 
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should be considered in the overall balancing analysis. For example, in 
Cardtoons, the court dismissed the prevention of emotional injuries as a 
justification for the right of publicity.112 According to the court, the 
right of publicity is intended “to protect against the loss of financial 
gain, not mental anguish.”113 As discussed earlier, this simplistic view 
does not represent a complete understanding of the right of publicity 
because it ignores the inherent dignity interest at stake in many public-
ity cases. The court bolstered its view by saying that the non-economic 
justifications for the right of publicity “further break down in the con-
text of parody, where the right to profit from one’s persona is reduced 
to the power to suppress criticism.”114 Had the court performed a more 
nuanced analysis, it might have grappled with the question of whether 
cases involving parody should include a different set of considerations 
with respect to a plaintiff’s dignity interest than other right of publicity 
cases. As the opinion stands, however, the court missed the opportunity 
to articulate a viable framework for evaluating the relevance of alleged 
dignity damage in this and future cases. 
 The court in C.B.C. Distribution, which followed and relied upon 
the approach in Cardtoons,115 performed a similarly unhelpful analysis, 
which perhaps can be excused somewhat more readily since this case 
did not involve a visible assault to the dignity of the major league play-
ers given that the case involved the unlicensed use of the players’ 
names and game statistics.116 Still, the court’s observation that “some 
courts have indicated that the right of publicity is intended to promote 
only economic interests and that noneconomic interests are more di-
rectly served by so-called rights of privacy,”117 not only fails to illuminate 
the relevant issues, but also misleads future courts where a dignity in-
terest may indeed be at stake. 
 By denying the petition for certiorari in C.B.C. Distribution, the Su-
preme Court missed an opportunity to address the apparent split 
among the courts regarding the appropriate test for resolving conflicts 
between the right of publicity and the First Amendment.118 The current 
                                                                                                                      
112 See 95 F.3d at 976. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 CBC Distribution, 505 F.3d at 823–24. 
116 Id. at 820. 
117 Id. at 824. 
118 See Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 128 S. Ct. at 2872 (denying certiorari). 
1364 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 50:1345 
lack of consensus in this area119 is disturbing because it creates a practi-
cal uncertainty for future litigants, as well as analytical chaos. Moreover, 
when a right of publicity claim involves potential damage to human 
dignity, the First Amendment analysis is particularly complex. As dis-
cussed in this Part, to date courts have not developed an appropriately 
nuanced analysis to address this issue. All of the tests applied by the 
courts are focused on the defendant’s relationship to the work or on 
the defendant’s intent in using the plaintiff’s persona rather than on 
the nature and impact of the dignity damage allegedly suffered by the 
plaintiff. Therefore, these tests do not afford adequate guidance in 
right of publicity cases in which the plaintiff is concerned with dignity 
damage to the integrity of her persona. Part III proposes a more suit-
able framework for addressing this issue. 
III. A Framework for Considering the Human Dignity 
Component in First Amendment Challenges to the Right of 
Publicity 
 Leading First Amendment scholars manifest an appreciation for 
the dual nature of free speech interests. In writing about the First 
Amendment, these theorists reveal a concern with the same dignity and 
autonomy interests at stake in right of publicity litigation. For example, 
Edwin Baker has proposed a “liberty” model for First Amendment pro-
tection according to which speech is protected “because of the value of 
speech conduct to the individual.”120 He sees “individual self-fulfillment 
and participation in change as the key First Amendment values.”121 
Martin Redish has developed a somewhat similar theory according to 
which he maintains that the only true value served by the First 
Amendment is “individual self-realization.”122 He understands the self-
realization concept as including an instrumental value that safeguards 
“the development of the individual’s powers and abilities” in order to 
realize her full potential, as well as an intrinsic value that guarantees 
individual control over one’s destiny.123 Both of these First Amendment 
theories emphasize the importance of an individual’s autonomy, which 
                                                                                                                      
119 Professor McCarthy summarizes the current state of the law by noting that “[c]lear 
answers to these questions have continued to elude both the Supreme Court and constitu-
tional scholars for many years.” 2 McCarthy, supra note 71, § 8:23, at 130–31. 
120 C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. Rev. 964, 
966, 990 (1978); see also Kwall, supra note 44. 
121 Id. at 991. 
122 Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 591, 593 (1982). 
123 Id. 
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is indeed an important interest protected by the right of publicity. As 
Baker asserts, “people’s choices, their definition and development of 
themselves, must be respected—otherwise they become mere objects for 
manipulation or means for realizing someone else’s ideals or de-
sires.”124 
 Although these two theories differ from one another in important 
ways,125 with respect to the right of publicity, the application of both 
theories results in the anomaly that the liberty or self-realization of the 
persona may impinge on the liberty or self-realization of those who 
seek to use the persona’s expression. The key to the successful applica-
tion of these free speech theories to the right of publicity lies in the 
recognition that balancing of rights is essential.126 
 The question, then, in cases involving publicity rights and the First 
Amendment, is how should courts evaluate the existence and nature of 
the damage to a persona’s dignity interest? I suggest that courts should 
carefully consider the following two factors. First, to what extent does 
the defendant’s use force the plaintiff to say something she does not 
want to say? Second, to what extent does the defendant’s use of the 
plaintiff’s persona result in the public perceiving a linkage between the 
plaintiff and the defendant’s use? 
 In a conflict between the right of publicity and the First Amend-
ment, courts should initially examine whether the defendant’s use re-
sults in a type of compelled or forced speech with respect to the public-
ity plaintiff. Consideration must be given to whether a given use of a 
persona’s expression is considered coercive because “to the extent that 
speech is involuntary . . . [it] does not involve the self-realization or self-
fulfillment of the speaker.”127 In developing his theory of free speech, 
Baker recognizes that “respect for the integrity and autonomy of the 
individual usually requires giving each person at least veto power over 
the use of . . . her own speech.”128 Therefore, speech is subject to con-
trol when it is “designed to disrespect and distort the integrity of an-
other’s mental processes.”129 Moreover, freedom of expression protects 
                                                                                                                      
124 Baker, supra note 120, at 992. 
125 Redish takes issue with Baker’s theory on the ground that it is too narrowly con-
fined, and therefore results in the exclusion of expression that should otherwise be pro-
tected. See Redish, supra note 122, at 620–22. 
126 See id. at 624. 
127 Baker, supra note 120, at 996. 
128 Id. at 1000. 
129 See id. at 1002. 
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against distortion of expression.130 The theory supporting the invoca-
tion of this factor would also seem to require that the individual’s ob-
jection to the use of her identity be reasonably credible. 
 An example of such compelled speech that is reasonably objec-
tionable to the persona arguably can be seen in the situation involving 
Jackie Mason’s action against the Jews for Jesus.131 The facts of this case 
suggest a highly coercive, prominent use of Mason’s persona, especially 
with respect to the cover of the defendant’s pamphlet, which featured a 
caricature of Mason accompanied by the legend: “Jackie Mason . . . A 
Jew for Jesus!?”132 In its brief, the defendant argued that “[t]he combi-
nation of exclamation point and question mark signals the incredulous 
tone of the question.”133 I would submit, however, that the defendant’s 
pamphlet, particularly the cover, involved a use of Mason’s persona to 
depict him saying something he does not believe. The “incredulous 
tone” of the legend also is not as clear-cut as the defendant suggests. A 
situation such as this triggers a dignity harm that is far more serious 
than one that simply involves an unflattering depiction because it tar-
gets the very essence of an individual’s autonomy interest. Despite the 
wide scope of protection the First Amendment offers religious materi-
als, the possibility that the defendant’s pamphlet constituted compelled 
speech would have been a fruitful avenue for the court to explore in 
this scenario. 
 My second proposal is that courts should consider the extent to 
which a defendant’s unauthorized appropriation of a plaintiff’s persona 
results in the public perceiving a linkage between the plaintiff and the 
defendant’s use. This consideration is grounded in the idea that in or-
der for there to be a true assault on a person’s dignity, the defendant’s 
use must be such that it compromises the public’s ability to understand 
that such use is “an original and separate expression, attributable to” an 
entity distinct from the persona.134 The right of publicity safeguards in-
dividuals’ abilities to control the public presentation of their personas in 
                                                                                                                      
130 Cf. Leslie Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, The Moral Right of Integrity: A Freedom of Expression, in 
2 New Directions in Copyright 150 (Fiona Macmillan ed., 2006) (observing that free-
dom of expression supports the right of integrity’s “protection against distortion of expres-
sion”). 
131 See Mason v. Jews for Jesus, No. 06 Civ. 6433(RMB), 2006 WL 3230279, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2006); see also supra notes 44–50 and accompanying text. 
132 See Defendant Jews for Jesus’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction at 3–4, Mason, 2006 WL 3230279. 
133 Id. at 20. 
134 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing fair use doctrine in 
copyright infringement case). 
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commercial contexts. Therefore, the requirement that actionable con-
duct requires a linkage by the public between the persona and the un-
authorized use is consistent with the human dignity interest underlying 
the right of publicity. Dignity as a construct is embodied in externalities 
that command respect and attention.135 Thus, dignity recognition de-
mands an external embodiment—the persona “constructed” by all indi-
viduals—which allows the inner personality to commodify and explain 
itself to the outside world. This externalized persona can be analogized 
to a conventional work of authorship in that the effort involved in the 
persona’s construction represents an intellectual, emotional, and physi-
cal effort on the part of the persona similar to that engaged in by any 
author. When that external construction is compromised by an unau-
thorized use that the public understands as emanating in some way from 
the persona, the dignity of the individual is damaged. On the other 
hand, the dignity violation is diminished absent a setting in which the 
public links the persona and the unauthorized use.136 
 Appropriate regard for these two considerations working in tan-
dem can greatly inform the analysis in cases of conflict between the 
right of publicity and the First Amendment. Specifically, the defen-
dant’s First Amendment interest is substantially diminished in situa-
tions in which the plaintiff is being forced to say something she does 
not believe and the public is likely to think that the defendant’s use is 
indeed linked to the plaintiff. Conversely, these factors can help to 
identify easy cases where the First Amendment should prevail. For ex-
ample, where it is obvious that the defendant’s work is fiction, the First 
Amendment generally should outweigh whatever dignity harms a plain-
tiff may claim. Such instances typically do not involve either coerced 
                                                                                                                      
135 Theologian Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik remarked in his classic work, The Lonely Man 
of Faith: “There is no dignity in anonymity. If one succeeds in putting his message . . . 
across he may lay claim to dignity.” Moreover, “[t]he silent person, whose message remains 
hidden and suppressed in the in-depth personality, cannot be considered dignified.” Jo-
seph B. Soloveitchik, The Lonely Man of Faith 26 (1965). In a similar vein, Bloustein 
linked his description of the inviolate personality to the subject of authors’ rights by ob-
serving: “It is because our Western ethico-religious tradition posits such dignity and inde-
pendence of will in the individual that the common law secures to a man ‘literary and 
artistic property’ —the right to determine ‘to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, emo-
tions shall be communicated to others.’” Bloustein, supra note 13, at 971 (quoting Samuel 
D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 198 (1890)). 
136 Cf. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (declining to hold that 
“a State’s interest in protecting public figures from emotional distress is sufficient to deny 
First Amendment protection to speech that is patently offensive and is intended to inflict 
emotional injury, even when that speech could not reasonably have been interpreted as 
stating actual facts about the public figure involved”). 
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speech or a risk of the public linking the defendant’s work with that of 
the plaintiff’s identity. With respect to pure fictionalizations clearly 
marketed as such, there is virtually no chance of deceiving the public or 
tarnishing the persona’s reputation. Thus, the basis for an alleged as-
sault to an individual’s dignity is reduced in these circumstances. An 
argument also can be made that fictionalized works derive their appeal 
more from the independent contribution of the work’s creator, as op-
posed to that of the persona. Moreover, there would be a tremendous 
chilling of incentives if writers were forced to compensate someone 
every time they created a character who resembled or was based upon a 
real individual.137 
 Parodies create their own unique set of circumstances in connec-
tion with personas, just as they do with respect to conventional copy-
righted texts. Recall that in Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Play-
ers Ass’n, the court held in favor of Cardtoons, emphasizing that parody 
merits complete protection under the First Amendment.138 In balanc-
ing the players’ property rights against Cardtoons’ free speech rights, 
the court pointed out that parody typically does not entail a high likeli-
hood of confusion over who is speaking, and that parody also presents a 
particularly compelling form of self-expression.139 Moreover, the court 
noted that “[p]arodies of celebrities are an especially valuable means of 
expression because of the role celebrities play in modern society.”140 Of 
course, parodies often involve unflattering uses of personas. In Card-
toons, the director of licensing for the Major League Baseball Players 
Association testified that his organization “would never license a parody 
which poked fun at the players.”141 Similarly, Carol Burnett would not 
have authorized the television show Family Guy to depict her character 
Charwoman mopping the floor in a porn shop.142 Nevertheless, it is 
precisely because the pubic typically understands that such parodies are 
not authorized that the public is not deceived as to the use of the per-
                                                                                                                      
137 Cf. Ruffin-Steinback v. dePasse, 267 F.3d 457, 462 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that the 
right of publicity does not extend to “fictionalized likenesses in a work protected by the 
First Amendment and the advertising incidental to such uses”). 
138 95 F.3d 959, 969, 976 (10th Cir. 1996). 
139 Id. at 970, 972. 
140 Id. at 972. The court continued that “a parody of a celebrity does not merely lam-
poon the celebrity, but exposes the weakness of the idea or value that the celebrity symbol-
izes in society.” Id. 
141 Id. 
142 See Burnett v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 491 F. Supp. 2d 962, 966, 971–72 
(C.D. Cal. 2007) (granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s copyright 
claim on the grounds that the parody constitutes fair use). 
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sona in the parody.143 Thus, most parodies lack the necessary linkage by 
the public between the parody and the persona to cause a dignity 
harm.144 
 In a similar vein, Eugene Volokh posits that a t-shirt featuring a 
picture of O.J. Simpson golfing with the text “Still looking for the real 
killer” would be “transformative” under the Comedy III test.145 According 
to the framework I propose, however, the reason the defendant should 
prevail in this example is not because of the transformative nature of 
the defendant’s use, but rather because this hypothetical does not in-
volve either coerced speech or the element of public linkage of the de-
fendant’s work to the publicity plaintiff. 
 Another example is furnished by the right of publicity action filed 
by Arnold Schwarzenegger concerning the manufacture and sale of a 
bobblehead doll in the Governor’s likeness wearing a business suit and 
carrying an assault rifle with a bandolier around its shoulder.146 Accord-
ing to David Welkowitz and Tyler Ochoa, the settlement illustrated that 
this was really a case of “stealth” defamation because it permitted the 
defendants to continue the manufacture and sale of the doll, absent 
the assault rifle and bandolier.147 Had this case gone to trial and re-
sulted in a judicial opinion, a likely focus of the discussion would have 
been whether the defendants’ activity constituted merchandising or 
political speech. In my view, the alleged dignity interest identified by 
Welkowitz and Ochoa could be disposed of at the outset by applying 
                                                                                                                      
143 In the Burnett case, the court also granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the 
plaintiff’s Lanham Act claim because the nature of the use “does not explicitly mislead the 
viewer as to affiliation, connection, association with, or sponsorship or approval by plain-
tiffs.” Id. at 973. But see Joseph H. King, Defamation Claims Based on Parody and Other Fanciful 
Communications Not Intended to Be Understood as Fact, 2008 Utah L. Rev. 875, 878, 918 (cri-
tiquing the judiciary’s monolithic approach that assumes that if an article overall is a par-
ody, there is no need for determining “whether some of the events depicted could rea-
sonably be interpreted as having actually occurred”). 
144 In Mason, the defendant claimed its use was a parody. See 2006 WL 3230279, at *1; 
see also supra notes 44–50 and accompanying text. A review of the case, however, suggests 
that a reasonable reader could very well draw the conclusion that Mason was somehow 
associated with the defendant, particularly given the use of his image on the cover with a 
suggestive legend that is open for different interpretations. See Mason, 2006 WL 3230279, 
at *1; see also Defendant Jews for Jesus’ Memorandum, supra note 132, at 3–6. 
145 Volokh, supra note 8, at 920–21. 
146 See Welkowitz & Ochoa, supra note 38, at 654. 
147 Id. at 653-–54 (noting “the settlement demonstrates that what Schwarzenegger ob-
jected to was not really the use of his image; it was the use of his image in a particular way”). 
Welkowitz and Ochoa assert that “a legal standard that effectively allows a political figure 
to censor non-defamatory political speech is hardly an appropriate role for the First 
Amendment.” Id. at 673. 
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the two proposed factors. Some may see this situation as involving an 
element of “coerced speech,” although given the overall context of the 
case, its presence is questionable. Nonetheless, the linkage factor 
clearly is absent as people would hardly assume that Schwarzenegger 
was behind the defendants’ product. Overall, then, this situation is 
similar to that involving fictionalizations or parody. 
 In contrast, a more difficult call is presented by an issue that sur-
faced during the 2008 presidential election when John Mellencamp 
and the Swedish group Abba publicly objected to presidential candi-
date Senator John McCain using their respective hit songs, “Our Coun-
try” and “Take a Chance on Me” as theme songs.148 To what extent 
should an individual be able to bar the use by a political candidate of a 
song recorded by, and publicly associated with, her persona? Depend-
ing on the circumstances, this type of situation can involve an element 
of coerced speech by the candidate with respect to the persona. The 
“linkage” issue also is present as it is conceivable that people would as-
sume endorsement on the part of the persona in these circumstances. 
Although the actual outcome presumably would be very fact depend-
ent, the factors proposed in this Article have the potential for inform-
ing the analysis in this type of situation. 
Conclusion 
 Although space constraints prevent me from addressing the im-
portant issue of appropriate remedies where dignity harms are found 
in connection with publicity actions, this area also deserves scholarly 
attention. In thinking about this aspect of the First Amendment and 
right of publicity conflict, it strikes me that there is much potential for 
mitigating the presence of compelled speech and public linkage 
through the creative use of disclaimer remedies.149 The remedial issue, 
however, flows logically from the question of liability which has been 
the focus of this Article. My goal has been to spur more critical thinking 
about the legal framework that should govern conflicts between the 
First Amendment and the right of publicity in situations involving an 
alleged dignity harm to the persona. In sum, I believe the law in this 
                                                                                                                      
148 See Carey Lening, Got Clearance? Why Failing to Clear a Song with the Artist May Spell 
More Than Just Political Embarrassment for Candidates, 75 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. 
(BNA) 575 (Mar. 28, 2008); see also Sarah Wheaton, Theme Songs and Others, N.Y. Times, 
Feb. 16, 2008, at A14 (providing other examples of presidential candidates who had to 
stop using certain songs in their campaigns). 
149 I explore in detail the topic of disclaimers as a remedial device in the context of 
moral rights actions in Kwall, supra note 44. 
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area would be clarified substantially by imposing explicit criteria for 
determining a defendant’s liability where a persona’s objection is to the 
nature—rather than to the existence—of the defendant’s use. 
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